Kiln

Kiln hasn't listed a bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure program on SOC2C. Many companies accept security reports at security@kiln.fi or via a /security page (Kiln lists a security contact).

Kiln lists 10 subprocessors on its trust center, including Amazon Web Services, GitHub, Google Workspace, Scaleway, Slack. Buyers use this for fourth-party risk review.

Kiln hosts on AWS, and handles Customer personally identifiable information, Employee personally identifiable information, Credit card information, Personal health information. Data residency details are on its trust center.

Kiln's trust center is at https://security.kiln.fi. Its verified SOC 2 status, frameworks, and documents are summarized on its SOC2C profile.

Kiln employs a comprehensive multi-layered security infrastructure that includes SOC2 Type II attestation, multi-cloud deployment across providers like AWS, GCP, and OVH, with all sensitive information secured in Hashicorp Vault⁠ instances⁠. The infrastructure features strict access controls, network isolation per blockchain, and geographic distribution of validators for resilience⁠⁠. Security measures include automated GitOps workflows, continuous monitoring, and regular security audits⁠. The platform is protected by multiple layers of anti-slashing protection endorsed by the Ethereum Foundation, and is backed by insurance coverage from providers like Amtrust and MunichRe.

We have a business continuity and disaster recovery plan which we were certified for as part of our successful SOC 2 audit. We have architected our platform to be resilient to underlying failure. Our main infrastructure is spread on 3 availability zones. In case of the loss of an availability zone we have a procedure to move resources on the remaining two. In case of the loss of all of our AWS availability zone in our main region, we can still access our Vault from a backup cloud provider location (Scaleway or another AWS region) and rebuild our infrastructure there. All of Kiln infrastructure is infrastructure as code (IAC) and stored in version controlled system (Git) and therefore can be recovered quickly. We run services in two additional clouds (Scaleway and OVH) which we could spin up in fast. We routinely test the migration of validator servers to new infrastructure platforms.

By design Kiln collects a very small amount of data - only what is necessary to provide our service: customers' email addresses, organisation names, and public wallet addresses which customers are delegating from. All other data surfaced is public blockchain data or derived from it. Kiln encrypts data at rest and in transit for all of our resources. We use tools like Amazon Web Service’s Key Management System (KMS) to manage encryption keys using hardware security modules for maximum security in line with industry best practices. Customer login data and organisation names are stored in industry-leading SaaS platform Auth0 (by Okta). Some analytics information is held in Segment (Twilio) and Mixpanel. Public wallet addresses are stored in AWS database services.

No, by design Kiln never has access to your assets. You are only delegating the rights to validate the blockchain with your funds, but no other rights are transferred to Kiln. On all dPOS chains (all except ETH), the staker always can unilaterally unstake their assets. It is therefore fully non-custodial at the protocol level. If Kiln disappears, the customer can issue this unstaking transaction using their custodian, a frontend app from the relevant ecosystem, or manually using a script. On Ethereum, this is slightly complicated by the fact that validator exits are done by issuing a transaction that includes a message signed by the validator private key, which is held by Kiln. Kiln therefore enables customers to retrieve this pre-signed message such that they can exit unilaterally. - To fund a validator, the depositor issues a deposit transaction into the Beacon Chain deposit contract. This is the contract in which all the ETH staked sits - currently 34M ETH / $73B. It is not upgradeable. - The only address this ETH can go to upon exit of the validator is to the `withdrawal_credentials` address set by the depositor upon deposit - Kiln’s batch deposit contract is a thin layer on top of the Beacon Chain deposit contract, it ‘batches’ calls to this contract for gas optimisation and does not hold any assets - Kiln customers can exit validators unilaterally at any time by sending a pre-signed exit message which they can retrieve at any point from the Kiln API - specs Following the Pectra upgrade (May 2025) it will be possible to trigger exits from the withdrawal wallet (similar to all dPOS protocols), so presigned exit messages will no longer be required.

We have purpose built our Ethereum infrastructure to mitigate slashing risk as much as possible. Our anti-slashing practices are endorsed by the Ethereum Foundation, and we have written about them at length in this blog post.

- When a new stable release is available for validator client nodes, we start by using it in testnet. For dPoS protocols, there is one node to update, for Ethereum we upgrade with a canary deployment method (test on 5 nodes, then 10, then 100 etc.) - Once we judge the testnet nodes are stable, we roll out the upgrade to mainnet (canary deployment for eth, direct roll out for dPoS) - Our infrastructure team uses alerting and monitoring during this multi-step release process to make sure everything works correctly, if anything wrong happens during a release, we have processes to roll back.

Both bare metal and cloud based on protocol specifics. We geographically split our nodes when possible, most are in the EU. We also use different client validators when possible.

Our SRE team is located in France and has administrator access to all the infrastructure. Software team does not have access to production services but can still access the platform and API services as administrators. No contractors have access to these services. Our access controls and corresponding procedures have been validated by our SOC2 certifications.

We do not own any datacenter but are using Cloud services located in Ireland, the US East coast, France, Italy, Poland and Canada. We can deploy to specific regions upon request.

We perform regular audits - at least once a year - as part of our SOC2 certifications. We also perform penetration tests and smart contract audits regularly (at least once per year). Our financial audits are performed every year starting from 2023.

Regulation Staking services are not currently subject to specific regulatory standards, however we are closely monitoring developments as members of trade groups ADAN in France and the Proof of Stake Alliance (PoSA) in the US. Compliance We are SOC2 Type 1 and SOC2 Type 2 compliant. We have a clear anti-money laundering policy that is reinforced by a KYC/AML set of procedures. Our Privacy Policy is available here

We do our best to fix containers vulnerabilities within SLA windows. We rely on third parties dependencies when building containers images. These third parties may take time to fix vulnerabilities or accept them in their codebase. When Kiln is building validator images for example, we use code based on public upstream project. Therefore we carry over the vulnerabilities from the project. For example if Cosmos has a vulnerability in upstream code. When building our Cosmos Docker image we will have the same vulnerabilities in our Custom container images. Even if vulnerabilities may be carried over from upstream project, we acknowledge them and Kiln infrastructure and containers are running on a secured infrastructure. Most of the vulnerabilities reported are not exploitable as is.